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Introduction
In Mary Shelly’s day, there were few standard ethical codes 
for research on humans. One can safely say there were no 
international professional codes concerning such work. 
Thus, the researcher in Shelley’s most well-known novel 
did not consult with current global ethical codes of research 
before constructing his automaton built based on a death-
bound criminal. If the novel had been written, set, and pub-
lished in 2016, perhaps taking place in a modern research 
institute, the scientist’s research would likely raise red flags 
for many among the scientific and philosophical reader-
ship, to the loss of the novel’s credibility (or its increase in 
drama from the lead character’s violating ethics). In many 
countries across the globe there are now ethical research 
committees to oversee project proposals and help ensure 
these adhere to ethical research guidelines.
However, despite the sordidness of Shelley’s novel, it 
took more than a century and the gruesomeness of World 
War Two with its Nazi doctors’ experimentation on human 
subjects to draw international attention to the need for 
worldwide professional codes for research on human sub-
jects (Faden and Beauchamp 1986). The 1945 Nuremburg 
code’s ten points were addressed to the practice of human 
experimentation (reflecting what seemed to go beyond 
mere medical clinical research in the Nazi cases) and were 
followed soon by the 1948 Declaration of Geneva. How-
ever, reflecting the increasing international community of 
medical research and its need for more precise ethical code, 
the 1964 Helsinki Declaration has proven to be the medi-
cal research ethical code so-far garnering the widest scope, 
respect, and support. It has undergone seven revisions since 
1964, most of these concerning greater detail of research 
and subject conditions. While the declaration is nonbinding 
and serves rather as a benchmark for professional codes in 
Abstract Since the Nuremberg Code and the first Decla-
ration of Helsinki, globally there has been increasing adop-
tion and adherence to procedures for ensuring that human 
subjects in research are as well informed as possible of the 
study’s reasons and risks and voluntarily consent to serv-
ing as subject. To do otherwise is essentially viewed as 
violation of the human research subject’s legal and moral 
rights. However, with the recent philosophical concerns 
about responsible robotics, the limits and ambiguities of 
research-subjects ethical codes become apparent on the 
matter of constructing automata that maximally resem-
ble human beings (as defined hereunder). In this case, the 
automata themselves, as products of research and develop-
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of research and development. However, such research faces 
a paradox: The subjects cannot give their informed consent 
to this research for their own development, although their 
consent would be needed for the research. According to 
ethical codes, this research would be unethical. The article 
then explores whether the background concepts giving rise 
to this paradox could be reframed in order to allow such 
research to proceed ethically.
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nations and organizations around the world, the most sali-
ent point is informed consent for human subjects  (Coun-
cil for International Organization of Medical Sciences 
(CIOMS) and World Health Organization 2002). The con-
cept has so well permeated professional associations world-
wide and become so embedded in clinical research, it has 
developed a de facto binding force (even if some research-
ers attempt to circumvent it).
Respected as these codes may widely be and adamantly 
as individuals and professional associations may strive to 
keep the codes up-to-date with scientific developments, 
they face a completely new challenge from research that 
is encroaching on medical-sciences’ grounds: automata—
especially humanlike automata—research and develop-
ment.1 The more humanlike, in both physical (Zhang et al. 
2015) and mental/emotional aspects (Zhang et  al. 2015), 
that these entities are designed and manufactured, the more 
one is called upon to consider the extent to which these 
would indeed warrant the respect and implementation of 
ethical research-guidelines. In contrast with research on 
Great Apes, concerning which many countries are slowly 
coming to recognize as persons (Cavalieri 2015), this new 
challenge for research ethics zeroes in on a very narrow 
population of potential persons (if one concedes that spe-
cies other than humans may be persons). As commonly 
happens in bioethics, one must carefully examine just what 
being a human entails at some general level.
However, considering that it may effectively not be pos-
sible, in this article, to provide a complete, necessary, and 
unanimously conceded delineation of the human being in 
toto, one may more modestly require only that we delin-
eate those qualifying traits relevant to the type of ethical 
situation at hand. In this case, automata of a specific sort 
may ontologically subsume a sufficient amount of quali-
ties shared with humans that they would warrant the same 
ethical research-guidelines as humans require. (Thus, we 
need not go into all the other qualities these two groups—
humans and automata—may share for all possible ethical 
situations.)2
The article proceeds by first zeroing in on the particular 
type of automata that will be of concern for the investiga-
tion and defining it: a type that, for now, is only theoretical, 
the so-called “maximally humanlike automata,” or MHA. 
This type is essential to the consideration of the extent to 
which ethics required for humans should be extended to 
automata. An answer to this situation can then help indicate 
the degree to which such ethics should be extended to other, 
less overtly humanlike, automata. The article next focuses 
on the ethical issue of concern here, that of informed con-
sent for human research-subjects and how it may apply to 
MHA. Within this discussion the paradox alluded to arises 
due to the particular nature of MHA as a type of entity: It 
seems they should have informed consent to undergo the 
research that causes their existence, yet they cannot grant 
that consent until they have been made. The understandable 
concern that such a paradox would apply to the prospect 
of bringing humans (infants) into existence is discussed 
and indicated as not evoking such a paradox. Two alterna-
tive “gradualist” approaches for handling the ethical para-
dox in automaton research and development in practice are 
described and assessed, with unclear results as to their truly 
solving the ethical problem. The conclusion discusses how 
this article’s ethical concern for MHA R&D can—consist-
ently with the article’s aim to use the MHA situation as an 
heuristic—point to ways to handle the commensurate prob-
lem in non-MHA R&D.
Humanlike and maximally humanlike automata
Defining the maximally humanlike
Before looking further into the extent to which automata 
may warrant ethical consideration commensurate with 
1 I have two reasons for using the term “automaton” instead of 
“robot,” and I hope the general philosophical and engineering com-
munity will seriously consider these reasons for their own termi-
nological usage. The first reason is a matter of association: The 
term “robots” throughout popular culture carries a connotation of a 
mechanical, awkward, slavish entity. I find “automaton” more pre-
cise but also more encompassing: As to more encompassing, there 
have been automata in cultural mythologies for millennia, such as the 
golem in Jewish culture. As to more precise, an “automaton” is basi-
cally an autonomous entity (though not normally including humans). 
There is less weighty connotative, cultural baggage in the term, com-
pared with “robot”. This preference segues into the second reason, 
which is twofold. (1) “robot” of course comes from Karel Capek’s 
play, R.U.D., for “Rossum’s Universal Robots,” in which play, as is 
widely known, the robot is a sex slaves. I believe that—fine though 
the play may be—that the term carries heavy cultural connotation, 
which has influenced people’s thinking about the entities—whether 
or not favorable (the more favorable the person is toward automata, 
perhaps the more questionable the motives for perpetuating the term 
“robot”). This quasi-moral preference is not the result of the genetic 
fallacy: I believe the connotation is deeply ingrained in the term and 
in society’s attitude about such entities. The idea of making any entity 
your slave—even a horse or automobile—is morally questionable. I 
believe it reflects a serious problem of values that has deeply troubled 
many human societies since the introduction of agriculture. I do not 
believe that, merely because an industry and an academic community 
concerned about this industry use this term, the term is legitimized 
for purposes of philosophical examination. (2) In trying to examine 
and assess philosophical issues related to automaton manufacture and 
use, I think it is fairer to use terms with less cultural and connotative 
baggage to stick as closely as possible to straightforward argument.
2 Some of the arguments in this article on automata research may 
pertain as well to research on certain human-derived materials, 
including gamete gene therapy. This fact does not affect the discus-
sion herein concerning automata, but does warrant separate work 
concerning consent and research on such human materials.
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that for Homo sapiens, it is necessary to delimit just which 
kinds of automata are of concern for this inquiry. Certainly, 
automata such as those used in manufacturing facilities, 
operating in space-explorer missions, or used for cleaning 
household floors, prima facie seem too far from humans in 
kind to warrant that any invasive research on them demands 
full human-subjects research informed consent. These 
automata are not designed to have sentience or share such 
human interests as making life goals or even stay alive, 
which qualities are commonly considered to form some 
basis for why humans’ have their particular moral status. 
(Feinberg 1980; Singer 1993; Cavalieri 2015).
At the other extreme are maximally humanlike automata 
(MHA).3 Such machines have not yet been constructed. 
However, as the prospect of constructing such entities has 
been widely discussed and pursued (Zhang et  al. 2015; 
Miller 2015) and nothing has yet proven that MHA are 
impossible, they warrant discussion for their potential 
moral status. These automata, which I will delineate more 
thoroughly, contrast with humanlike automata, which class 
includes MHA but also much more limited automata cur-
rently available such as Aiko Chihira, which greets shop-
pers at a department store (Hu 2015) or Nadine (Gau-
din 2016). This humanoid is designed to appear, at least 
within a predetermined viewing range, a human being: 
with humanlike hair and (plastic) skin, smiling, talking, 
and making gestures. However, the automaton still is not 
designed to have sentience or share human interests such 
as lifetime goals; its moral status still would seem to merit 
that currently ascribed to Homo sapiens.
By contrast, MHA as I define these below, are designed 
to have all the qualities that, at least arguably, would merit 
their having moral status commensurate with humans. For 
the purposes of this paper, MHA will be those who can 
pass a fairly rigorous version of the Turing Test which can 
be called the Three-dimensional Turing Test (TTT, or  T3 
or T-cubed). The standard Turing Test, suggested by the 
mathematician in 1950 (Turing 1950), involves two sub-
jects, or operators—a computer and a human—in a differ-
ent room from the human assessor, who works at a console, 
communicating with the other two. If the assessor can dis-
cern which responses are coming from the computer and 
which from the human, the computer passes and is deemed 
to have an intelligence level commensurate with that of 
humans.4 This original test has long come under fire, with 
many new versions that are suggested to solve the former’s 
shortcomings. (Bion 1979; Feigenbaum 2003; Harnad 
2004) Yet, strictly for this article’s purposes, mere level of 
intelligence would not suffice to assess the automaton as 
humanlike.
The so‑called TTT
The concept of “TTT” serves here as a definitional require-
ment—arbitrarily given, but with reasoned criteria so that 
the pertinent issue at hand (the ethical issue of informed 
consent) can be placed within automata research and get 
some traction to motivate the discussion. The reason for 
why the automaton should, in appearance, behavior, and 
conversation be indistinguishable from a human is to ren-
der the automaton maximally humanlike. The reasoning 
behind this criterion is that, as far as we bona fide human 
beings can tell, the automaton is so humanlike we would be 
greatly challenged to say why it is indeed not human. If we 
cannot readily say why it is not human, then, ceteris pari-
bus, there is no immediate reason why it should not have 
identical moral status with humans and merit the same ethi-
cal treatment, specifically vis-à-vis informed consent.
Other Turing tests more involved or complex than 
the one Turing first suggested have been offered, includ-
ing Harnad’s (1991) Total Turing Test, which involves 
automata behavior as well as language as necessary for 
observers to distinguish whether a automaton possess, or 
at least exhibits, human intelligence. Hauser (1993) criti-
cized Harnad for going too far in restricting what could 
count for machine humanlike intelligence, yet Schweitzer 
(1998), in his Truly Total Turing Test, went even further 
suggesting we should also have to know the entity’s com-
plete history (“evolution”) before we could truly determine 
such intelligence. However, for the purposes of this arti-
cle, the T-cubed as defined here is looking for more than 
mere intelligence but deep humanlikeness in every possible 
aspect, from language use to behavior, from uses of tongue 
to toes, articulateness and other “naturalness,” so that not 
mere intelligence but completeness as human is exhibited 
as indistinguishable from a bona fide Home sapiens.
While this condition may be too strict—and among all 
the Turing-Tests debates, is certainly wracked by potential 
theoretical controversies—I offer it as a criterion for the 
specifically ethical issues at hand vis-à-vis human moral 
status.
Aim and drawbacks of the T‑cubed
The type of automata of concern here is that which 
resembles physically; mentally, culturally, socially and 
3 Because the singular “automaton” and plural “automata” have the 
same initial “A,” in this article I simple use the same “MHA” for the 
singular and plural, letting context differentiate them, instead of using 
the clunky “MHAs” for the plural.
4 There has been at least one report of an artificial intelligence sys-
tem coming very close to passing a Turing Test of the original sort, 
with the assessors reaching 30% accuracy. This AI system, Eugene 
Goostman, was designed to mimic a 13-year-old male of contempo-
rary industrial society and culture. (Mann 2014).
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emotionally a human being as much as possible. Thus, 
the test required for this entity to pass as humanlike would 
require at least two subjects, one human and one automa-
tion; both interacting with each other and perhaps other 
persons. If, after some preset period, say 2  h, the asses-
sors cannot tell which is the human or the automaton, the 
automaton passes and is deemed maximally humanlike. 
Such a three-dimensional (actually four) test is needed5 
because the goal of the presumed humanoid manufacturer 
is to construct an automaton that cannot be mistaken from 
a human.
There may be objections to even the T-cubed because 
it is only a behavioral test. Many people do not subscribe 
to behaviorism and so may maintain that we still could not 
know if this MHA is indeed experiencing the world, per-
ceiving it, sensing it. That is, it may exhibit thoroughly 
intelligent human behavior and yet not be conscious or sen-
tient. One response may be that one cannot exhibit human-
like intelligence unless one is conscious and sentient. 
A further objection would be that because the MHA is 
mechanical,6 it cannot share the full range of human inter-
ests, such as the need for organic food and the agricultural 
infrastructure that goes with it, so it would have interests 
of basically different sort. MHA would have such different 
social and political needs from humans as not to mesh with 
sufficient fitness into human society; and as human soci-
ety is so centrally social, these MHA could not cogently 
be deemed human, no matter how much they look and, out 
of larger context, often act like humans. In response, I can-
not here delve further into this issue, as it is only tangen-
tial to this article’s concern with informed consent: Even 
if these MHA do not share the same range of interests with 
humans, it is at least plausible they have a commensurate 
level of moral status as humans, even with different bases. 
This presumed plausibility is enough to fuel the article’s 
concerns.
Distinguishing MHA from related humanoids in terms 
of place in society
Now that I’ve distinguished the basic characteristics of 
MHAs from other humanoid automata, it could be help-
ful to orient the discussion further by considering what 
place these entities would have in human society. Such 
inquiry, though, at once is stymied by the fact that, if they 
are indeed indistinguishable from humans and as far as 
we can tell should thence receive the same ethical consid-
erations as bona fide Homo sapiens, then the issue of just 
what tasks they should be accomplishing would become 
not merely moot but perhaps inimical to the ethical pro-
ject. That is, whereas humans are not formed to be certain 
specialties, humanoid automata may be specialized as: 
sex or companionship suppliers (Hauskeller 2014), infant 
caregivers (Sharkey and Sharkey 2010) elderly caregiv-
ers (Sharkey and Sharkey 2012), teachers (Sharkey 2015), 
medical or technical-medical practitioners (Santoni de 
Sio and van Wynsberghe 2016), or military killers (Arkin 
2013; O’Çonnell 2014; Sharkey 2016). Therefore, if MHA 
are indeed to be maximally humanlike, and humanlikeness 
entails being neither a slave nor having their social-behav-
ioral traits predetermined (serving as an automaton sex 
professional or killer warrior), then an MHA should indeed 
be fully autonomous in terms of what kind of life it should 
live. As a corollary, an automaton built to serve as a spe-
cific person’s marriage mate or as a “caregiver” or a killing 
machine would not be fully human.
One objection here would be that manufacturers would 
have no motivation to build a machine that would be so 
very humanlike, to the point that a consumer would have no 
motivation in buying one if the consumer could not have a 
preferred use for the product. This objection overlooks the 
strong possibility that, given engineering challenges and 
common operational motivations in themselves, engineers 
and R&D departments may be drawn to construct an MHA 
that is indeed as humanlike as described—to the point of 
being non-saleable—merely because:
1. Solving an engineering problem for its own sake can 
be an operational motivation—perhaps not the happiest 
situation for ethicists, but such problem-solving for its 
own sake often been a powerful “force” in technologi-
cal development.
2. Solving the problem well could bring a great amount 
of prestige.
3. There may be some apology for the spinoff effect—
that research in a certain direction may benefit humans 
through spinoff products or for humans’ better under-
standing of themselves and their species.
4. Comprehensive doctrines of engineers and inventors 
who look to a future which is heavily imbued with such 
5 More precisely, the test is four-dimensional, because the automaton 
must move and speak over some period of time. I retain the emphasis 
on three dimensions to highlight the physical presence of the automa-
ton as actor, in contrast to a computer console.
6 For simplifying the argument in this article, I am here considering 
only mechanically based MHA, not entities that are constructed out 
of biological parts. Thus, to allude to movies, I am considering only 
automata like the Alien character Ash, who is revealed at one point to 
be mechanical; By contrast, Roy and the replicants of Blade Runner 
appear to be biologically based (possibly cyborgs, but the movie does 
not make this distinction clear). Some may object that biological is 
mechanical, merely of a different sort. While I would agree, the bio-
logical, while a subset of the mechanical, is of a significantly, differ-
ently based construction as to merit different consideration for estab-
lishing moral statuses on different bases. In any case, this distinction 
between mechanical and biological automata makes no difference to 
this article’s subject of informed consent.
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machinery, even to the point that MHAs dominate and 
the human species eventually fade away, may serve as 
motivation for constructing such automata.
The question here is not whether any of these reasons 
to manufacture MHA are morally ad politically commend-
able, but only that there are potentially strong motivations 
for inventing MHA, even if they are not directly put to any 
immediate “use” by consumers.
Another important distinction for MHA compared with 
other humanoid types comes up in Bryson’s work (2000, 
2009, 2010) on the place of automata in society. Bryson 
maintains that automata should be “our” slaves—slave 
to their master humans. Her outlook has merit in spirit, 
but her terminology unfortunately overshadows the senti-
ment. The problem is the term “slave.” If slavery is, as 
most of the world now concurs, not morally good, it is 
reasonable to deduce that not only should no one be any-
one’s slave, but also no one should be anyone’s master. 
There is something about the relationship that is wrong. 
In current human morality, it is wrong for one organism 
to exert total control over another. Acting in such a way 
that that organism is wholly in one’s control is good nei-
ther for the master nor for the slave. Even though farm 
animals are harnessed for the sake of humans, they can, 
via proper (traditional) husbandry (see Rollin 2011), be 
treated in such a way the human is not mere master over a 
slave animal.
The same reasoning can be turned to human as mas-
ter over slave-machine. There is some harm to one’s own 
higher moral values and moral character if one establishes 
oneself as master. One may propose that one value that 
leads one to be master is excessive ease and comfort. Even 
Locke, notoriously a plantation owner, at the least observed 
(if hypocritically) that there is a rightful amount of goods 
one may attain to maintain subsistence, and beyond that is 
taking from others. Surely, some persons, such as generals 
or corporate leaders, who cannot manage all their personal 
affairs alone, need personal assistance. Yet, such tasks can 
be handled by paid—sufficiently paid—voluntary servants. 
One need not have absolute control over such a life to get 
the tasks done, and ethically so. The problem of using and 
treating machines as slaves is that one perpetuates a value 
that sustains the inappropriate agent character, seeing the 
world and its denizens as one’s slaves. You simply should 
not treat the world as a place in which your will is absolute. 
You thereby only strengthen that absolutist, disregarding 
will.
One may use a tool, though, without being its master 
and without it being one’s slave. Perhaps Bryson could 
have more cogently written that “Robots should be our 
tools.”
Informed consent for research and development 
of MHA
If humans’ moral status warrants that they have a right to 
informed consent (IC) attained before they become sub-
jects in research, then if MHA as well merit commensurate 
moral status, they as well merit IC. Clearly, if any such pro-
cedure were proposed for an MHA, the researchers must 
first attain the entity’s consent. However, an interesting 
question arises as to whether the very research and devel-
opment that lead to the MHA’s existence should not also 
require the MHA’s informed consent. If so, a serious par-
adox arises: one cannot get the entity’s informed consent 
before the entity exists. Thus, if one is to treat the automa-
ton as having moral status commensurate with humans, 
one cannot bring it into existence. Yet, without existence, it 
cannot be said to have moral status commensurate with that 
of humans, as existence is required for moral status.
This worry seems to be based on some flaws, and these 
should be aired before proceeding. For one matter, it seems 
the research and development that goes into producing 
the automaton is analogous to the process of gestation in 
a human. We do not demand the informed consent of the 
fetus to be born, which consent would be impossible to 
attain. Furthermore, it is sometimes possible to do experi-
ments upon a fetus (National Institutes of Health 2016), 
attaining only the consent of the parents acting in proxy as 
the fetus’s representatives. It would appear that the fetus is 
assumed not to be a person or at least not yet a full human 
being.
In response, invasive medical research is strongly dis-
couraged in pregnant women (Helmreich et  al. 2007) 
because of potential risks to the fetus. However; as research 
solely to benefit the fetus may be performed with the due 
IC mentioned, similarly may vulnerable people (Bramstedt 
2003; Appelbaum 2007) including the mentally disabled 
be allowed to participate in experiments if their guardians 
consent as representatives. (Committee on Bioethics 1995) 
In both cases, the subjects are not considered subhuman; 
but humans whose interests are presumably watched over 
as carefully by their guardians as they would be watched by 
themselves if practically possible.
The seeming parallel between fetal gestation and MHA 
construction relies upon a category mistake. A fetus does 
not arise from research and development.7 It comes into 
being through an entirely different process from that of 
7 I am dismissing here the unfalsifiable if poetic metaphor that the 
process of evolution is one of research and development. Assuming 
evolution is not guided by a deity or powerful extraterrestrial, it is not 
a conscious process of one or more minds seeking some kind of prod-
uct of a specific design—such as that which could pass a T-cubed.
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the R&D of present concern. This process is not seeking 
to make an entity that resembles a human as much as pos-
sible. Instead, the human entity so happens to grow into a 
being that not merely resembles a full human being but is 
one. The fetus’s development is not research. Even if one 
could somehow communicate with a fetus and inform it 
about the process it was going through, an IC would not be 
germane as this process does not bear the essential traits of 
the research process of scientific experimentation that does 
require informed consent for human subjects.8 The essential 
traits of scientific experimentation that most scientists and 
philosophers of science plausibly would concede include:
• A specific isolable variable one is investigating, to see 
which actions or behavior occur with the variable pre-
sent or absent;
• Most often, whenever possible, a matching control 
group tested for the response to the variable opposite to 
that of the experimental group;
• A falsifiable hypothesis by which to assess these results, 
a standard for making this assessment, and an epistemic 
context which allows for critical testing.
• A research community and its set of hypotheses and 
confirming or disaffirming results creating a context in 
which to assess the experiment and its hypothesis.9
The process of fetus development does not adhere to 
any of these traits of scientific experimentation.10 There is 
no specific variable that anyone is testing, no designated 
control group, and therefore a falsifiable hypothesis is 
irrelevant as well as is any research community. By con-
trast, for MHA research and development, each of these 
points applies to the research, as constant experiments are 
needed to test variables, within a context of hypotheses 
about how those variables would point to the goal (making 
a maximally humanlike entity), along with standards for 
assessing the hypotheses according to experimental results, 
and a global research community working with a set of at 
least intersecting hypotheses.
Another objection is that the research that goes into 
making the MHA is not performed upon the MHA itself 
but upon precursory parts that, in the end, ideally become 
the MHA. Informed consent thus is not germane. The situ-
ation misses the essential prerequisite, and that is that the 
subject must exist in order for it to give consent at all.
This objection rests on mistaken assumptions. One prob-
lem is that a potential subject need not be alive (exist) at the 
time at which the research is done or when consent must be 
obtained. Dead persons may have given consent when alive 
but dead when the research is performed upon the cadaver. 
Proxies, such as guardians or parents, may give informed 
consent for subjects not alive at the time of consent, such 
as a fetus who has died. The objection may then note that 
the automaton, before being fully operable (if that be analo-
gous to “fully alive”), can have consent given by its guard-
ians, who likely are the designers/manufacturers, so that 
research may continue until the automaton is fully oper-
able. However, this objection overlooks the fact that the 
type of consent given by the proxies of the human subjects 
is not for research for knowledge that will make the sub-
ject come into existence (as is the case for the automaton) 
but for performing an experiment or similar research on a 
single variable in a scientific fashion. Research and devel-
opment for the automaton will certainly involve many sci-
entific experiments concerning pinpointed variables on the 
component parts which require no consent by the parts. But 
research that requires the bundling of the parts tested for 
variables, such that the bundle when operable in a single 
device would be ready for the T-cubed, is of the sort that it 
would be done upon a device that potentially is an MHA. 
That is, it just may turn out to be an MHA, once tested by 
T-cubed.
Thus it would seem that in case the automaton does, by 
T-cubed, have claim to human moral status, it should in the 
meantime be treated as if it has that status. That bundled 
research—bundling the parts into the whole entity that may 
have human moral status—is done upon an entity that, even 
as it comes to completion, may be one with human moral 
status. Here is where counterfactuals come in, although the 
paradox returns.
Counterfactually, one asks whether the automaton, 
once fully operable, would have given its consent to the 
final bundling research had it been capable of being fully, 
8 There is an argument that, although human reproduction per se may 
not be a scientific experiment, it nonetheless involves a human sub-
ject who may hypothetically merit a type of informed consent merely 
to be brought into life, despite the nigh-insurmountable practicalities 
of attaining such consent. However, this objection would not affect 
the present argument’s thrust, and may even support it, if informed 
consent for coming-into-being is indeed morally required.
9 Certainly there is plenty of scientific research that is not experi-
mental, including some human-subjects research, such as filling out 
questionnaires, that may not have distinct experimental or control 
groups. Some research is purely observational, such as observing how 
pedestrians act in city traffic. However; as the Helsinki Declaration 
evidences, even much of this research requires informed consent, as 
the Tearoom Trade: Impersonal Sex in Public Places case (Hum-
phrey 1970; Lenza 2004) and the subsequent understanding that even 
observational sociological research on human subjects also requires 
informed consent.
10 Some may object that some processes, such as in  vitro fertiliza-
tion or even embryonic gene selection, are a kind of experiment. 
The objection misses the point that it is the development itself that 
is in question as to whether it is an experiment, not how the develop-
ment was triggered. Another scenario would be that of a couple who 
declares to one another, “Let’s experiment and see what kind of baby 
we make.” Yet, to this scenario the same response about how the 
development is triggered applies.
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that is sufficiently, informed. The objection is right that 
the component parts still unbundled cannot give informed 
consent, and once the parts are fully bundled and eligible 
for the T-cubed, it is too late to give informed consent for 
the research and development forming that final operable 
bundle. But this too-lateness does not resolve the need for 
the consent, merely because the informing and consenting 
cannot be done at the requisite time. Then to answer the 
counterfactual, would the operating automaton have given 
its consent if it had been capable of being fully informed? 
On the one hand, the answer might depend upon the 
MHA’s response to having been designed and manufac-
tured. Or, the question may simply not register, as in fact it 
is veritably an inscrutable question. Or, the counterfactual 
may just point up the fact that this research and develop-
ment—the bundling of parts to create an MHA—is indeed 
a type of research on subjects for which it is impossible to 
get informed consent and so that research, to be consistent 
with the current spirit of ethical research guidelines, should 
not pass. Thereby the paradox remains: while research must 
not be done on subjects with humanlike potential and thus 
human moral status without IC, the subjects of this MHA 
research are not yet at the stage where they can give their 
informed consent when the time for that consent (the final 
bundling) is needed.
Gradualism as an alternative approach
There may be a way to unravel this paradox, or at least 
cope with it, by two gradualist approaches, which I will 
cover. One is starting with evidently non-MHA automata 
and working gradually toward specimens more evidently 
ensured to pass the T-cubed, perhaps asking the fully 
assembled automata the counterfactual—whether they 
would have consented to the research that made them had 
they been capable of being fully informed. The other grad-
ualism would be to start with the component parts of the 
projected MHA and, as the bundling of parts is gradually 
increased toward the projected whole, striving to answer 
at each step of the growing bundle whether it would con-
sent to the research that is constructing it, upon being duly 
apprised. However, upon closer study, both of these forms 
of gradualism face similar drawbacks, one being epistemic, 
the other being that the paradox slips back in even in the 
fine-grained scale of gradualism.
By the first method, in starting with an automaton that 
by all reasonable evidence, especially of its designed 
structure but also of its performance and purposes, is not 
humanlike, one can began taking steps toward an MHA. At 
each step along the way to greater, more humanlike com-
plexity, one attempts to describe to the subject the proce-
dure performed upon it in an effort to obtain an informed 
consent. Certainly, the automaton could be programmed 
in such a way as to be able to repeat what has been told it 
and assent if it seems to the researcher reasonable to do so 
in anticipation of the automaton’s capacity. But such pro-
gramming would seem to be cheating. At some point before 
attaining a maximally humanlike profile, there would pre-
sumably be a gray area where machines incapable of mak-
ing informed consent would start to give way to machines 
that would dimly be capable of making informed consent, 
and finally machines that could make such consent as cred-
ibly as any qualifying human.
This gradualism has at least two flaws, both epistemic, 
one involving whether a researcher can be assured that the 
specimen created can give informed consent; the other evi-
dentiary, specifically whether the evidence can be inter-
preted in proper time in the IC process. The less serious 
and perhaps surmountable, is epistemic in terms of know-
ing whether the automaton being built is sufficiently com-
prehending the information to make informed consent. 
Namely, one would preliminarily need in place a cogent 
heuristic for determining whether any device constructed 
along the stepwise progress is indeed capable of under-
standing the information for making informed consent and 
has sufficient capacity for values, self-evaluation, and self-
understanding to make a sound judgment for consent. The 
researchers and designers, then, would have to have effec-
tively in place, likely from work on the machine constitut-
ing the previous step, an understanding of what constitutes 
human-level understanding of instructions and human-level 
judgment that can account for bona fide consent. Yet, that 
previous step would have the similar epistemic problem, 
which is then only deferred. The whole stepwise process is 
thereby epistemically challenged. One may object that what 
constitutes the proper understanding needed for proper IC 
would simply just develop throughout the worldwide robot-
ics and cognitive science community as research in these 
fields proceeds. However, this assurance is only of blind 
faith and may well not come about, leaving the epistemic 
challenge unmet.
The second problem is evidentiary, also concerning the 
ethical issue of requiring research-subject informed con-
sent and the paradox this demand poses for automata: In 
this case of specimen-by-specimen gradualism, along the 
stepwise process, at any stage X, upon enacting the con-
sent procedure, one needs sure evidence (assuming the pre-
vious paragraph’s analysis is correct) that the subject has 
given informed consent. If one informs the subject and asks 
consent and it declines, one is too late, as the research has 
already been done. This form of gradualism still cannot cir-
cumvent the paradox.
The second kind of gradualism involves an automaton 
that the researchers anticipate will pass as an MHA or a 
very humanlike automaton nonetheless. For the automaton, 
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there will be some amount C of components, such that, 
once all assembled will as a bundle constitute an operat-
ing device. With this gradualist approach to obtaining 
informed consent, the researchers start with a reasonably 
substantial assembly of parts to the bundle, but well—say, 
halfway—before the bundle is complete. They inform the 
partial bundle of the research’s purpose and ask for its 
IC, which at this first level the partial bundle should still 
be incapable of consenting. But then the team adds the 
next substantial component and again goes through the 
informed-consent procedure. Thus they continue until 
the automaton being assembled component-by-compo-
nent can make a response—either informatively consent-
ing or declining sufficiently, as far as can be reasonably 
affirmed, in the research community, as bona fide consent 
or declination.
However, this second gradualism exhibits flaws similar 
to those in the first type of gradualism: the first epistemic 
problem arises much like with the specimen-to-specimen 
gradualism, in that even with each addition of the bundle, 
one still lacks the grounded epistemic measure for ensuring 
each step in the bundling is indeed giving informed con-
sent. And as with specimen-to-specimen gradualism, bun-
dling gradualism is also impeded by the fact that any assent 
or declination on the subject’s part comes too late, as the 
research in question will have been done. In sum, these two 
gradualistic methods of circumventing the informed-con-
sent problem are, at the least, themselves too problematic to 
achieve the projected solution.
Conclusion
The prominent human-rights documents, such as the United 
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNUDHR, 
United Nations 1948) do not specifically mention a human 
right to IC as potential research subjects. However, in most 
cases of medical and related human-subjects research, lack 
of informed consent may be seen as violation of other human 
rights specified in such documents. For example, lack of 
informed consent would be a violation of UNUDHR’s Arti-
cle 3, the right to liberty and security. In extreme cases, it 
may be seen as a form of demeaning treatment (Article 5) 
or even as slavery (Article 4). More typical research without 
consent could be a violation of privacy (Article 12), or the 
right to remuneration for work done (Article 23, Paragraph 
3). Although the document does not list informed consent for 
human-subjects research, performing such research on some-
one without their due consent is clearly a violation of inter-
nationally recognized human rights.
An MHA may or may not actually be a human being, 
even if it passes the T-cubed. (Much here matters on a suf-
ficiently precise definition of human being.) However, the 
quandary posed by such an MHA in terms of informed con-
sent is that it just may qualify, if not precisely for a human 
being, then for a being meriting all the rights that human 
beings enjoy. This quandary arises from the paradox of 
its construction vis-à-vis informed consent: it cannot give 
its consent for the relevant research and development per-
formed to ensure its existence. If we concede:
1. The interpretation that this kind of research to pro-
duce an MHA is unusual because it involves consent 
that cannot be given because the full entity does not 
yet exist at the crucial time when its final research and 
development occurs and consent would be needed; and 
if we concede:
2. The possibility that the MHA could retrospectively 
affirm its consent,
then a deep informed-consent problem remains. There is 
also a possibility that the MHA could retrospectively say 
it does not give its consent. And one of the central tenets 
of informed consent ethics is to protect those who elect not 
to be experimented upon. This problem alone is enough to 
deem such research and development by definition incapa-
ble of obtaining the due, across-all-subjects consent.
If only one subject is experimented upon without its 
positive consent, that research has violated ethical proce-
dures. This MHA research in question cannot guarantee 
there will be no (after-the-fact) declinations of consent (dis-
counting cheaters). This kind of research then is susceptible 
to human-rights violations. It would follow that responsi-
ble institutional review boards could not pass such MHA 
research applications, for being intrinsically unethical.
I have used an extreme case—of R&D for MHA—to 
make the problem of informed consent for responsible 
robotics research on humanlike automata to make the issue 
as salient as possible. As the section above on gradual-
ism implies, it would be hard to find just the point, or area 
even, along the spectrum from research on automata rang-
ing from the clearly non-sentient, non-humanlike to the 
T-cubed-passing MHA, where responsible robotics review 
committees would be obliged to deny the application. 
This fact of this quandary of the spectrum does not mean 
that the problem for MHA research does not stand. It only 
means there must be very careful ethical discussion about 
where to start getting concerned that the research would 
be ethically unacceptable for passing the review. Given the 
momentum, or at least the enthusiasm, among parties aim-
ing on something much like an MHA, those entities some-
what less humanlike but perhaps still deserving informed 
(very hard-to-obtain) consent would arrive on the review-
boards’ rosters well before an MHA would. An initial 
effort may be to convince researchers, administrators, and 
professional associations that it is time to start including 
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humanlike automata research on their ethical research 
board’s agendas. Ethical inquiry into this article’s subject 
matter is urgent, and I hope this article may serve as a cata-
lyst to researchers and philosophers to put this issue of IC 
for MHA into their hopper.
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